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Wittgenstein’s experiments on rhythm, conducted in Charles Myers’s laboratory 
in Cambridge during the years 1912–13, are his earliest recorded engagement 
in thinking about music, not just appreciating it, and philosophizing by means 
of musical thinking. In this essay, I set these experiments within their appropri-
ate intellectual, scientific, and philosophical context in order to show that, its 
minor scientific importance notwithstanding, this onetime excursion into empirical 
research provided an early onset for Wittgenstein’s career-long exploration of 
the philosophically pervasive implications of aspects. Dramatically moving beyond 
the conceptual limitations, which were inscribed by Charles Myers’s scientific pro-
gram, Wittgenstein got a glimpse of a philosophical angle, which was bound to 
become very important to him not only in aesthetics, but also for his overarching 
philosophical development. He became interested in what we actually do when we 
re-phrase, compare, come up with good similes in order to illuminate something 
definite within the space of possibility, so a new aspect may come to life.
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‘Make and cultivate music, said the dream’ (Plato, Phaedo).1
‘I had a natural propensity to think about ideas which arise in music’ (Ludwig 
Wittgenstein).2
 1 Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates: Four Dialogues, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Dover, 1992), 58. 
 2 M, 9:40. Works by Wittgenstein are abbreviated as follows: The Big Typescript: TS 213, ed. and trans. C. Grant 
Luckhardt and  Maximilian A. E. Aue (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), abbreviated as BT; The Blue and Brown Books: Pre-
liminary Studies for the ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), abbreviated as BB; Culture 
and Value, 2nd ed., ed. Georg Henrik von Wright and Alois Pichler, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 
abbreviated as CV; Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology: Preliminary Studies for Part 2 of ‘Philosophical 
Investigations’, vol. 1, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximil-
ian A. E. Aue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), abbreviated as LW I; Ludwig Wittgenstein: Cambridge 
Letters; Correspondence with Russell, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey and Sraffa, ed. Brian McGuinness and Georg Henrik 
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While a student in Cambridge, Wittgenstein engaged enthusiastically for a while, in 1912 
and 1913, in the empirical study of rhythmic perception at the newly built, technologically 
cutting-edge laboratory for experimental psychology, headed by the eminent British psy-
chologist Charles S. Myers.3 In a few of these experiments Wittgenstein collaborated with 
Bernard Muscio, a young Australian researcher at Myers’s laboratory, who studied philosophy 
with James Ward.4 David Pinsent, a fellow student with musical talent and a good friend of 
Wittgenstein, often served as a test subject. Pinsent recorded in his diary and letters many 
hours of experiments, and also mentioned conversations in which rhythm was discussed. 
Wittgenstein’s experiments resulted in two public presentations in Cambridge. The first 
was given in July 1912 before the British Psychological Society, and the second occurred in 
May 1913, on the occasion of the ceremonial opening of the new laboratory for experimen-
tal psychology, which also included Wittgenstein’s demonstration of an apparatus for the 
 psychological investigation of rhythm.
Wittgenstein’s 1912–13 experiments on rhythm are his earliest recorded engagement in 
thinking about music, not just appreciating it, and philosophizing by means of musical think-
ing. In this essay, I set these experiments within their appropriate intellectual, scientific, and 
philosophical context in order to show that, its minor scientific importance notwithstanding, 
this onetime excursion into empirical research provided an early onset for Wittgenstein’s 
career-long exploration of the philosophically pervasive implications of aspects. The theme 
of aspects was not only a cornerstone of Wittgenstein’s conception of aesthetics, but also 
central to his overall philosophical development.
In Section I of this essay, I set Wittgenstein’s experiments in their scientific context, both 
in experimental psychology and in musicology. I argue that in the laboratory Wittgenstein 
followed Charles Myers’s scientific program. Myers focused mostly on the simplest musical 
elements in order to trace the origins of our musical appreciation and attitudes. Wittgenstein 
initially followed Myers’s conviction that aesthetic experience, which is evoked by complex 
artistic forms, is encapsulated in the experience of ‘simple material’.
In Section II I argue that Wittgenstein produced in these experiments the onset of what 
he would later call ‘noticing an aspect’. The experiments produced a sonic equivalent of an 
von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), abbreviated as CL; Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions, ed. 
James C. Klagge and Alfred Nordmann (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), abbreviated as PPO; Note-
books 1914–1916, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscobme (Oxford: Black-
well, 1961), abbreviated as NB; Philosophical Grammar, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Anthony Kenny (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1974), abbreviated as PG; Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush 
Rhees, trans. G. E. M.  Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), abbreviated as PI; Philosophical Remarks, ed. Rush 
Rhees, trans.  Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), abbreviated as PR; Remarks on the 
 Philosophy of  Psychology, vol. 1, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), abbreviated as RPP I; Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. 2, ed. Georg  Henrik 
von Wright and Heikki Nyman, trans. C. Grant Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue (Chicago: University of  Chicago 
Press, 1980), abbreviated as RPP II; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge, 1995), 
abbreviated as TLP;  Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1930–1933; From the Notes of G. E. Moore, ed. David G. 
Stern, Brian Rogers, and Gabriel Citron (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), abbreviated as M; Zettel, 
ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and Georg Henrik von Wright, trans. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), 
abbreviated as Z; Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann, The Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle, ed. 
Gordon Baker, trans. Gordon Baker et al. (London: Routledge, 2003), abbreviated as VW.
 3 See PPO, pp. 359–60; Brian McGuinness, Wittgenstein, A Life: Young Ludwig, 1889–1921 (Berkeley, CA:  University 
of California Press, 1988), 125–29; Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius (New York: Free Press, 
1990), 49–50; Michael Nedo and Michele Ranchetti, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Sein Leben in Bildern und Texten 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 84; Eran Guter, ‘Where Languages End: Ludwig Wittgenstein at the Cross-
roads of Music, Language, and the World’, PhD thesis, Boston University, 2004, 27–39.
 4 W. M. O’Neil, ‘Muscio, Bernard (1887–1926)’, Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, 
Australian National University, 1986, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/muscio-bernard-7714/text13511.
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ambiguous figure and Wittgenstein was aware of this, by his own admission. I argue that the 
conceptual limitations and the technological rigidity of the scientific apparatus for these 
experiments inevitably placed Wittgenstein’s goal to investigate the nature of rhythm and its 
importance in music out of reach.
In Section III I offer a close reading of Wittgenstein’s own account in retrospect of his 
original impetus behind the experiments.5 I argue that as Wittgenstein was hoping, by his 
own admission, to engage his test subjects in making illuminating comparisons inside an 
aesthetic system, he was in fact making a pioneering philosophical leap not only beyond 
psychology’s mode of explaining things away, but also, and much more importantly, beyond 
Myers’s simplistic conception of the simple as a component of the complex, beyond the ten-
dency of rendering the simple and the complex as patent opposites, as contrasting qualities 
along a line of hierarchical, ordered development.
In Section IV I use Juliet Floyd’s evolutionary account of the emergence of aspect-phrasing 
in early Wittgenstein to underscore the strikingly forward-looking philosophical impetus 
behind the experiments. I argue that the kind of attention to the activity of characterizing, 
and to the varieties of techniques for making illuminating comparisons, that Wittgenstein 
was seeking in his conversations with his test subjects, turns out to have been quite incongru-
ous with the view of logic that was about to shape the Tractatus, anticipating, remarkably, the 
tenets of his much later philosophy, in particular what I propose to call the ‘master simile’ of 
language as music.
I. The Experiments in Their Scientific Context
Wittgenstein’s experiments concerned a phenomenon then called ‘subjective rhythm’, aim-
ing to determine the conditions under which subjects heard or read into a sequence of beats 
a rhythm which, in a sense, was not there. By 1912 this phenomenon had already been well 
documented and studied. As early as the 1890s, published research demonstrated that beat 
trains appear to group into units of two, three, or four despite being isochronal and equitonal 
and hence devoid of cues relating to coherence or pattern.6 In such cases, the initial beat was 
perceived to be accented, and time intervals between beats within each group appeared to be 
shorter than the interval between one group’s final beat and the next group’s initial beat. Of 
course, nothing about this phenomenon is more subjective than any other instance of rhythm 
perception, as Wittgenstein himself realized. According to McGuinness, Wittgenstein may 
have used some of the technical apparatus in use in other laboratories in such experiments: 
placing a metronome in a box, raising the lid unobserved by the subject, and comparing the 
beats thus stressed with those heard as stressed by the subject; or, alternately, tightening the 
elastic with which hammers are held so as to produce tones at a louder volume.7 In these 
kinds of experiments, the dynamic context brings about a similar reorganization of temporal 
experience: the interval following the louder beat seems shorter, and the interval preceding 
the louder note seems longer.8
In a lecture on May 26, 1933, Wittgenstein recounted some of his scientific findings in 
those 1912–13 experiments on rhythm:
 5 This rare account was made available only recently upon the publication of G. E. Moore’s complete notes from 
Wittgenstein’s 1930–33 lectures in Cambridge. See M.
 6 See T. L. Bolton, ‘Rhythm’, American Journal of Psychology 6 (1894): 145–238; Wilhelm Wundt, Grundzüge 
der physiologischer Psychologie, vol. 3 (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1903); Herbert Woodrow, ‘A Quantitative Study of 
Rhythm’, Archives of Psychology 14 (1909): 1–66. 
 7 McGuinness, Wittgenstein, A Life, 128.
 8 Stephen Handel, Listening: An Introduction to the Perception of Auditory Events (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1989), 386–89.
Guter: The Philosophical Significance of Wittgenstein’s Experiments on Rhythm 31
I did find out one thing, moderately interesting.
We wound a machine which didn’t stress any notes.
 When this was done, every one heard an accent on the last/first/of the three. 
(Perhaps not exactly this; but –
1. You do hear some stresses, though machine doesn’t give them
2.  You can find laws which regulate what stress you hear. e.g. you try to divide 
into bars.
You tend not to stress 2 consecutive beats.
If you construct a rhythm in such a way that 2 tendencies conflict, a curious effect 
is produced – that of a constant stumbling. (M, 9:41–42)
In his lecture on May 16, 1947 (as reported by Gilbert Harris Edwards), Wittgenstein also 
referred to the experiments:
Talk of visual organization suggests grouping. Thus if a series of sounds of the same 
nature follow at equal distances in time, we can hear e.g. every second one as accented. 
[…] Suppose we say we hear the sounds accented ˇ ˉ [short/long]. We may ask if this is 
an auditory matter. Of course it is. There is an auditory experience which will justify it; 
and we can have such an experience in fact, we can hear the sounds as they are really 
produced ˇ ˉ [short/long]. (PPO, p. 360)
Wittgenstein’s important point here is that we use a description of an actual rhythm for the 
accent heard in the isochronal and equitonal pulse train. To appreciate the  philosophical 
significance of Wittgenstein’s experiments and their results, we first need to consider 
what he was aiming for within the context of the work being carried out in the  laboratory 
at the time, first and foremost by Charles Myers himself, who was directly involved in 
Wittgenstein’s experiments.
Charles Myers’s own research up until 1913 focused on two, ultimately interdependent 
lines of investigation: a study of so-called primitive music and rhythm, and an analysis of 
individual differences in listening to tones and music. This kind of work exemplifies a broad 
concern regarding the putative origins of music that had become widespread in Europe 
since the turn of the twentieth century.9 Myers maintained that the question concerning 
the  origins of music and that of how it evolved in the way it did are intrinsically connected. 
Brian McGuinness suggests that Wittgenstein may have heard the talk Myers gave in 1912 
on primitive music at the Moral Sciences Club in Cambridge, during which Myers sang some 
of the pieces he had brought back to England.10 If Wittgenstein indeed attended that talk, 
he might also have heard Myers express his conviction that early advances in choral sing-
ing in Europe, which required regular and frequent accents, hampered the development of 
complications of rhythmic  succession that are the hallmark of so-called primitive music; only 
relatively recently have Western composers managed to successfully depart from a uniformity 
of rhythm.11
In his experimental work, Myers focused mostly on the simplest musical elements in order 
to trace the origins of our musical appreciation and attitudes, thus bringing together the two 
aforementioned tiers of his work:
 9 See Alexander Rehding, ‘The Quest for the Origins of Music in Germany Circa 1900’, Journal of the American 
Musicological Society 53 (2000): 345–85.
 10 McGuinness, Wittgenstein, A Life, 127.
 11 See Charles S. Myers, ‘A Study of Rhythm in Primitive Music’, British Journal of Psychology 1 (1905): 397–406.
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It is, I think, of no little psychological and experimental interest to note the consequent 
value of investigations with the simplest materials for our understanding of the aspects 
adopted, the kind of appeal made, in the case of works of art. It seems probable that the 
experience of beauty is rooted in man’s remote past when it could be evoked by such 
simple material as one or two tones or splashes of colour, i.e. by the most primitive 
forms conceivable of art material, just as today it is evoked by more complex forms.12
It is easy to see Wittgenstein following suit in his experiments by his investigation of one such 
fundamental ‘simple material’: rhythm. Rhythm is an essential element in the structuring of 
musical time (in tonal music),13 a topic which continued to fascinate Wittgenstein through-
out his career. His scientific rationale was solid: ‘My idea was to investigate nature of rhythm, 
because you can produce it quite exactly by machinery’ (M, 9:40). His upshot, boldly stated 
as the idea ‘to investigate [the] nature of rhythm’, also aligned itself with Myers’s belief that 
aesthetic experience, which is evoked by complex artistic forms, is encapsulated in the experi-
ence of such ‘simple material’. This bold conclusion was corroborated by David Pinsent, who 
understood from Wittgenstein at the time that the experiments, in which he participated, 
were meant to ‘ascertain the extent and importance of rhythm in music’.14
However, the significance of Wittgenstein’s experiments extended beyond Myers’s meth-
odological framework. Indeed, his scientific findings were moderately interesting at best, as 
he candidly admitted. Their significance is rather in the way that these experiments may have 
prompted Wittgenstein, so early in his career, to get a glimpse of what lies ahead for him.
II. Aspects and Phrasing
The striking thing about those experiments on rhythm is the fact, which has remained 
for the most part unacknowledged in scholarly literature, that Wittgenstein produced in 
them the onset of what he would later call ‘noticing an aspect’. The experiments produced 
a sonic equivalent of an ambiguous figure. Wittgenstein’s test subject could have heard the 
 isochronal and equitonal pulse train either as duple (or, less likely, quadruple) meter or as 
triple meter. That is, he could have heard the accent either every other beat or every two 
beats, and he could have flipped back and forth between the two rhythmic patterns at will. 
As in Wittgenstein’s own early example of the Necker Cube (TLP 5.5423), different ‘hearings’ 
(rhythms) manifest themselves according to different manners of projection.
It is crucially important that Wittgenstein actually confirmed that he attempted to tweak 
the experiment in order to produce a conflict between possibilities, between two tenden-
cies to hear only one aspect of the isochronal and equitonal pulse train. He reported that he 
discovered that ‘if you construct a rhythm in such a way that 2 tendencies conflict, a curious 
effect is produced – that of a constant stumbling’ (M, 9:42). This is without precedent: the 
earliest evidence of Wittgenstein’s career-long exploration of the philosophically pervasive 
implications of noticing an aspect, predating even his first treatment of aspects in his early 
writings on logic and mathematics.15
 12 Quoted in C. W. Valentine, The Experimental Psychology of Beauty (London: Methuen, 1962), 207.
 13 Musical motion is enabled by a multilevel structuring of three facets: a hierarchy of tonal materials, rhythmic 
grouping and patterning, and a sense of closure. While the tonal materials provide pitch hierarchy, the rhythmic 
grouping and patterning of these tonal materials both organize and regulate their flow into musical events, 
thereby creating additional hierarchic layers. The coordination of pitch and rhythm enables punctuation, which 
gives rise to a sense of closure.
 14 Quoted in Nedo and Ranchetti, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 84.
 15 Comp. Juliet Floyd, ‘On Being Surprised: Wittgenstein on Aspect-Perception, Logic and Mathematics’, in  Seeing 
Wittgenstein Anew: New Essays on Aspect Seeing, ed. William Day and Victor Krebs (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press, 2010), 314–33.
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In the Big Typescript, Wittgenstein offers a serviceable image, framing matters clearly for 
our present concerns:
But the notion of ‘seeing something in something’ is taken from the case where I see 
the figure | | | |, for example, ‘phrased’ differently. But in that case – and in a differ-
ent sense – I really am seeing different figures, and what they have in common, aside 
from their similarity, is that they were caused by the same physical image. (BT, p. 251)
Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘phrasing’ here is much closer to music (a specific grouping of 
consecutive notes) than to language (putting something into a specific form of words).16 Indeed, 
just as we can see a new possibility in | | | | such as || || or ||| |, Wittgenstein’s test subjects 
could differently phrase the isochronal and equitonal pulse train into duple or triple meter. The 
perceived rhythms, the phrasing and re-phrasing of the physical pulse train, reveal possibilities 
in the  physical pulse train that may not have been realized before. In other words, we become 
acquainted with an aspect of the physical pulse train through the specific way and manner in 
which we phrase it in the characterization.17 Noticing these aspects is patently new and surprising.
Against this backdrop, we can say that Wittgenstein, looking into the phrasings of his test 
subjects, in fact intended to probe the dialectic of meter and rhythm, the kernel of the duality 
of time control – the musical element which draws in significance in music (especially in cases 
of non-linear tempi) as it is being performed.18 This topic remained central to Wittgenstein’s 
thinking about and through music throughout his career. In much later passages he was still 
mulling over the difference between playing on the beat and playing according to the meas-
ure (both captured in the German term Takt; see CV, pp. 85, 92).19 Playing according to the 
measure is couched in terms of the meter, not as a time signature for the metronome, but 
as a mode of attending (by the performers and the listeners), and in terms of rhythm as the 
ordered time attended. Thus, Wittgenstein determines that the simultaneity [Zeitgleichheit] 
of the clock and simultaneity in music are by no means equivalent concepts. The concept 
of simultaneity in musical performance is rough and vague in relation to our techniques of 
representation; yet as such it is needed to characterize our experience.
Yet one of the crucial elements in any successful management of musical time is achieving 
the ‘right’ tempo in performance. This is often an elusive target, a matter of searching for a 
fitting characterization, even in musical styles that are familiar and whose performing prac-
tices are well documented. For Wittgenstein, achieving the right tempo is a perfect example 
for what he called an ‘aesthetic puzzle’ (in his lectures on aesthetics in 1933 and 1938). It 
involves the possibility of hearing something differently, ‘just as you may find the head in a 
puzzle-picture’ (M, 9:31). The point is that merely setting the metronome will not solve the 
aesthetic puzzle: the proof is in the playing, in the aptly collaborative realm of music-making. 
Making a choice about tempo is another instance of characterizing, of assembling in a spe-
cific field of valence and possibility and contrast. By characterizing we draw in significance, 
evincing a physiognomy. The attempt to characterize involves, as Juliet Floyd puts it, ‘the 
 16 Wittgenstein actually refers in Zettel to ‘phrasing by eye or ear’. See Z, p. 38, § 208.
 17 See Juliet Floyd, ‘Aspects of Aspects’, in The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, 2nd ed., ed. Hans Sluga and 
David Stern (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 381.
 18 See David Epstein, Shaping Time: Music, the Brain, and Performance (New York: Schirmer, 1995), chap. 11.
 19 I discuss these passages at length in Eran Guter, ‘Measure for Measure: Wittgenstein’s Critique of the 
Augustinian Picture of Music’, in Wittgenstein and the Limits of Language, ed. Hanne Appelqvist (London: 
 Routledge, 2019), 245–69.
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“coming into view” of a scheme of possibilities available for characterization given a particular 
mode of characterization’.20
The specificity of characterization means that by characterizing we can ‘get it just right’, 
can meet or miss the mark, so we patently need to seek the right level and arrangement 
of elements in order to reveal something, to discover ways in which things and possibili-
ties become significant for us. Wittgenstein wrote: ‘I think it is an important & remarkable 
fact that a musical theme, if it is played <at> (very) different tempi, changes its character. 
Transition from quantity to quality’ (CV, p. 84). Such transition from quantity to quality, from 
configuration to an aspect, was precisely at the heart of what Wittgenstein was looking for in 
his 1912–13 experiments on rhythm. Yet the conceptual limitations (including the purported 
reduction of music to ‘simple materials’) and the technological rigidity of the scientific appa-
ratus (as described in the previous section) are clear: under these musically sterile conditions 
phrasing and characterizing could not feed back into a choice of tempo. There was no room 
for a sense of the aesthetically ‘right’. In the laboratory Wittgenstein’s ultimate goal – ‘to 
investigate the nature of rhythm’ or ‘to ascertain the extent and importance of rhythm in 
music’ – remained inevitably out of reach. Wittgenstein was quite aware of this at the time. 
In a letter to Bertrand Russell on July 1, 1912, Wittgenstein ridiculed his own presentation 
before the British Psychological Society as ‘a most absurd paper on rhythms’ (CL, p. 16).
III. The Quest for Illuminating Comparisons
In his lecture in Cambridge on May 26, 1933, Wittgenstein provided specific context for his 
self-criticism concerning his onetime stint at the laboratory: ‘The idea of Psychology explain-
ing Aesthetic experiences I once had myself, & made useless experiments on rhythm in the 
laboratory’ (M, 9:40). In the 1930–33 lectures, Wittgenstein conceived of aesthetics as a 
mode of discussion, or rather as the cultivating of a mode of discussion, which concerns what 
he variously calls ‘aesthetic controversy’, ‘aesthetic enquiry’ or ‘aesthetic investigation’, and 
‘aesthetic puzzle’ or ‘aesthetic puzzlement’. An ‘aesthetic controversy’ occurs always in situ: 
it concerns something concrete that needs to be resolved, worked out, corrected, or agreed 
upon for a particular purpose – hence an aesthetic discussion is always particular, addressing 
a tension arising in the case at hand. For Wittgenstein, music (that is, music making) affords 
the most typical examples (M, 9:19). Thus, Wittgenstein sets himself the task in these lectures 
of clarifying the mode of discussion appropriate to aesthetics, which he understood in terms 
of the attempt to remove some form of aesthetic puzzlement or other.
Wittgenstein proceeds to explicate the unique character of aesthetic discussions by means 
of a contrast between experimental psychology and psychoanalysis. This is clearly one of the 
most striking features of his 1933 lectures on aesthetics. The upshot for him is that whereas 
psychology has ‘a tendency to explain away’ (M, 9:39), ‘aesthetics like psychoanalysis doesn’t 
explain anything away’ (M, 9:45). The uniqueness of aesthetics lies in the nature of the expla-
nations (reasons, justifications) that are offered and accepted in the attempt to address, 
and possibly remove, a given instance of aesthetic puzzlement. Contrasting the modes of 
explanation in psychology and psychoanalysis allows him to spell out the conversational, 
 non-hypothetical and therein immanently human character of aesthetics.
The crux of Wittgenstein’s distinction between psychology and psychoanalysis is his dis-
tinction between hypothesis and representation. Hypothesis transcends the particular cases, 
which the general laws, posited by the hypothesis, cover. Representation, on the other hand, 
is un-hypothetical in the sense of affording a mere picture as a useful device, which ‘enables 
 20 Floyd, ‘Aspects of Aspects’, 368.
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[one] to overlook a system at a glance’ (M, 9:38). It inheres in the particular case by means 
of paraphrasing, giving good similes, which result in a collective arrangement of (often sur-
prisingly) similar cases. ‘Criterion of correctness of aesthetic analysis must be agreement of 
person to whom I make it,’ says Wittgenstein: ‘Freud’s remark that we don’t know why we 
laugh /when hear a joke/ points to the puzzle which gives rise to aesthetics. But aesthetics 
does not lie in finding a mechanism’ (M, 9:46). In the last analysis, according to Wittgenstein, 
‘Freud’s discoveries are in fact merely of striking ways of expressing certain facts, & seeing 
them in a system: not causal explanations’ (M, 9:47). And ‘what Freud says sounds as if it were 
science, but is in fact a wonderful representation’ (M, 9:50). Indeed, for Wittgenstein, ‘Freud 
on “Wit” is a good example of an Aesthetic investigation’ (M, 9:45); ‘it is aesthetic in so far as 
it isn’t hypothetical’ (M, 9:37).
While causal explanations turn a blind eye to the manifold ‘verifying phenomena’ in 
human interaction (see M, 9:43), aesthetic explanations preserve them in their fullness: ‘I 
say all Aesthetics is of nature of giving a paraphrase, even if same words also express a 
 hypothesis. It is giving a good simile’ (M, 9:37). That is why Wittgenstein maintains that 
aesthetics does not explain anything away. What is unique about aesthetic explanation is 
that it calls for reasons, not causes. ‘Aesthetic craving for an explanation is not satisfied 
by a hypothesis,’ he says: ‘This is what I mean by saying Aesthetics is not Psychology’ (M, 
9:39). ‘What is a reason in Aesthetics?’ he asks: ‘A reason for having this word in this place 
rather than that; this musical phrase rather than that’ (M, 9:30; comp. PI, §§ 527–35); ‘a 
reason consists in drawing your attention to something which removes an uneasiness’ (M, 
9:33). A reason, in this sense, addresses what presents itself as a necessity, an experience of 
meaning: for example, ‘Why is this note absolutely necessary?’ (M, 9:31) Aesthetic explana-
tion involves presenting  phenomena, laid out side by side, independently of the causally 
determined sequence of events, in a creative, fitting order, which enables one to see things 
with understanding. To answer an aesthetic puzzle one needs to make a synopsis possible 
(M, 9:39). The  open-endedness of the discussion, its flow, is regulated by manifold, nuanced, 
patently  incalculable ‘verifying phenomena’ of the parties involved.
In retrospect, Wittgenstein was not interested in tinkering with perceptual oddities just for 
the common scientific thrill of ‘find[ing] laws which regulate what stress you hear’ (M, 9:41). 
He set himself to probe the nature of rhythm (as he said) or to ascertain the extent and 
importance of rhythm in music (as Pinsent reported) because it harbored an idea that he 
already found crucially important – a philosophical idea: ‘I was looking forward to talking 
with my subjects about something which interested me. I was looking for utterances inside 
an aesthetic system. […] When I made those experiments, what would have satisfied me was 
comparison, within a system’ (M, 9:40–41). Wittgenstein chose to focus in his experiments on 
the musical element of rhythm, the counting and recounting of musical time, because it was 
the easiest to model experimentally by means of a mechanism (M, 9:40). Yet he was first and 
foremost interested in why significance is drawn in. To his frustration, in the actual setting of 
the experiments his subjects did not comply:
To most people the rhythm meant nothing: one lady said: ‘It makes me feel like a 
 butterfly with a pin through me’.
Why is this interesting? If you were merely looking for effects of rhythm, here you’ve 
got one.
But I was looking for utterances inside an aesthetic system.
If I ask ‘Why do you like this tune?’ & answer is ‘Because it reminds me of my 
 grandmother’, this doesn’t interest me. (ibid., my emphasis)
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Wittgenstein’s subjects answered the how question, the psychological (hypothetical) one, 
instead of the why question, the aesthetic. Wittgenstein said: ‘The question of Aesthetics is 
not: Do you like it? But, if you do, why do you?’ (M, 9:27) It is also not the question of how 
a particular effect is produced, and, most pertinent to the context of his experiments on 
rhythm, it does not concern ‘what machinery produced it’ (M, 9:40) – ‘aesthetics does not lie 
in finding a mechanism’ (M, 9:46). To answer the why question, the question about signifi-
cance, to give a reason, requires making comparisons and ordering, as we draw in a field of 
possibilities and necessities, eventually offering the gift of a good simile.
In his 1912–13 experiments, Wittgenstein had hoped to receive good similes from his sub-
jects as an answer to the why question of aesthetics – in his middle-period terminology, he 
refers to this as specific ‘comparisons within a system’, an aesthetic system, one of a multitude 
of possible such systems. The explanation of meaning is always a sentence inside an autono-
mous system of rules. Meaning is what an explanation of meaning inside a system explains.
In Wittgenstein’s middle-period view,21 the primary condition for understanding a sentence 
is the knowledge not of how it is to be compared with reality or how it can be made true, but 
rather of its relation to other sentences in a language system. So what we need to look at when 
we want to understand what is relevant with regard to aesthetic impressions is how they are 
expressed in a sentence, and how this sentence relates to other sentences in the same language 
system. That sentence’s specificity depends solely on other sentences in the same system; 
one always means something ‘in contrast to’ other given  possibilities in the system. When 
one explains what one means, one explains it in contrast to other possible  explanations in 
the system, choosing one of the system’s possibilities.
Moreover, Wittgenstein insisted (in relation to his experiments on rhythm), ‘you want to 
compare notes but not any notes; only those which are illuminating’ (M, 9:41). Such char-
acterization requires a choice and an effort ‘to get it right’ within the space of possibility 
(a ‘synopsis’) in order to show someone else and enable a response. Consider the musical 
example, which Wittgenstein gave in direct relation to the philosophical shortcomings of his 
experiments on rhythm:
If you hear music in one of the ancient modes, an ending doesn’t at first seem like an 
ending. But one can be made to understand it in various ways:
(1) you could point out similar things in our modern keys
(2) you could leave out the tonic: & say: You’ve got to imagine it.
[…]
What sort of thing is not understanding a church mode? & therefore ‘understanding’?
What makes you ‘understand’ is a typical aesthetic explanation.
When I made those experiments, what would have satisfied me was comparison, within a 
system. You want to compare notes but not any notes; only those which are illuminating. 
(M, 9:41, my emphasis)
The case of understanding (or failing to understand) church modes recurs throughout 
Wittgenstein’s middle and later periods (see PR, p. 281, § 224; PI, p. 144, § 535; RPP I, p. 118, 
§ 639). He raises the question regarding not understanding the ending of a piece of music, 
namely, a chant written in one of the church modes. His question is: what sort of thing is not 
 21 More specifically, in the framework of what Engelmann describes as Wittgenstein’s ‘genetic method’. See 
Mauro L. Engelmann, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Development: Phenomenology, Grammar, Method, and the 
 Anthropological View (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 95–98. 
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understanding a church mode? An answer to that question should prepare the way to appre-
ciate what it is to understand a church mode.
Wittgenstein describes a case in which we listen to a chant, and when it ends we experience 
the ending, the final tone, as imposed rather than necessary. This is what not understand-
ing the church mode amounts to in this example. The question ‘why does this final tone 
feel imposed?’ is analogous to the question ‘why is this note absolutely necessary?’, which 
Wittgenstein raised elsewhere. Both questions posit a puzzle, which Wittgenstein asserts 
could be answered via the presentation of a synopsis, by placing things side by side, mak-
ing comparisons, drawing in a field of possibilities and necessities. The striking thing about 
Wittgenstein’s example is the underlying notion of the twofoldness of the relevant pitch 
collection, which is involved in this particular instance of not understanding a church mode. 
This is easily shown in the case of the ancient Hypodorian scale, which is virtually identical in 
terms of pitch collection to a modern A minor scale.22 What is the difference between the two 
scales? Why would one not understand the Hypodorian scale, yet understand the A minor? 
Why would we be blind to one of the two aspects of a given physical pitch collection?
The finalis (final tone) of the Hypodorian scale is the fourth tone of the A minor scale. 
Hearing the ending as imposed means that we had certain expectations for the assertion 
of the tonic (in a modern key), which the assertion of the finalis seems to defy. Hence, not 
understanding a church mode means that we failed to distinguish two alternate principles 
of organization for the pitch collection. One principle, belonging to the church mode, is 
 rhetorical, a matter of the orderly delivery of the verses, and intervallic, an expression of 
thinking musically in terms of local relations between two pitches (as opposed to harmonic 
thinking). The other principle, belonging to the modern scale, is hierarchical, that is, a matter 
of systematized pitch relations all gravitating toward the central tone of the scale. And so, 
seeing necessity where there is none, we vainly looked for tonal directedness.
Wittgenstein’s suggestion as to how someone can be made to understand the church mode 
amounts to teaching him differences: the difference between the two principles of organi-
zation. Leaving out the tonic in a modern key, showing that one readily imagines it, allows 
one to directly experience the hierarchy. Not understanding that this is just one possibility is 
precisely what prevents one from hearing the ending of the chant as necessary.
Now if, as Wittgenstein said, the example of not understanding a church mode points to 
what he was really looking for in his 1912–13 experiments on rhythm, then in fact he has made 
a pioneering philosophical leap – beyond Charles Myers’s scientific program for explaining 
aesthetic experience, and beyond psychology’s mode of explaining away. Wittgenstein was 
spurred to move decisively, even dramatically, beyond Myers’s simplistic conception of the 
simple as a component of the complex, beyond the tendency of rendering the simple and 
the complex as patent opposites, as contrasting qualities along a line of hierarchical, ordered 
development. These early experiments on rhythm turned out to be an origin of Wittgenstein’s 
mature philosophical realization that what is taken to be simple within one procedure or 
way of looking at things may, regarded by itself, wind up as being complex.23 That is to say, 
simplicity is not absolute, neither as a fixed point of departure or as a fixed destination, but 
rather is relative to a choice of system, and is always in medias res – an idea that Wittgenstein 
made explicit in his philosophical thinking only much later (see PI, pp. 21–31, §§ 46–64). 
The philosophical shortcomings of these early experiments taught Wittgenstein that a touch-
stone of simplicity, the noticing of an aspect in the pulse train, characterized rhythmically, 
 22 This example was suggested to me by Inbal Guter.
 23 See Juliet Floyd, ‘The Fluidity of Simplicity: Philosophy, Mathematics, Art’, in Simplicity: Ideals of Practice in 
Mathematics and the Arts, ed. Roman Kossak and Philip Ording (New York: Springer, 2017), 153–75.
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may come to look like a possible step in a journey, a starting point that we can share, break 
off from, pass off to the next person, reject, discuss, and contest.
For Wittgenstein, the significance of noticing that rhythm was in its being an achievement 
of acquaintance: a shared understanding, a moment in a conversation. This is the sense in 
which (he thought) aesthetics does not explain anything away (M, 9:45). This is also what we 
do when we partake in musical understanding (as performers or listeners): we re-phrase, com-
pare, come up with good similes in order to illuminate something definite within the space 
of possibility, so that a new possibility or aspect may come to life. It is quite remarkable that 
Wittgenstein was determined to engage his subjects in giving aesthetic explanations of this 
sort as early as the years 1912–13. Yet, as he said: ‘I had a natural propensity to think about 
ideas which arise in music’ (M, 9:40).
IV. Language as Music: A Master Simile
Read in context, Wittgenstein’s 1912–13 experiments on rhythm, his earliest recorded 
exploration of aspects, disclose a robust, philosophically far-reaching role for music in his 
 philosophical development. This can be best appreciated against the backdrop of Juliet 
Floyd’s recent evolutionary account of the emergence of aspect-phrasing in the early 
Wittgenstein, and the way these primary considerations eventually propelled Wittgenstein’s 
transition from the framework of the Tractatus to his middle and then later work, where the 
theme of aspects reached its full maturity and philosophic effect.24
According to Floyd, the initial impetus for Wittgenstein’s career-long engagement with 
the theme of aspects was his push against Russell’s notion of acquaintance. Wittgenstein’s 
refashioning of Russell’s notion of acquaintance involved two major tasks: resurrecting our 
working modal notions of possibility and necessity, and returning Russellian acquaintance to 
its everyday home, the sense in which we may be acquainted with a person. For this purpose, 
Wittgenstein developed what Floyd calls ‘a master simile’, likening the notion of an ‘aspect’ 
in logic to the ‘look’ or ‘character’ of a face, a facial expression or feature. Floyd’s substan-
tial contribution lies in her explanation of how Wittgenstein refashioned Russell’s notion of 
acquaintance, which draws us to the private realm of sense data, in a way which returns us to 
the activity of characterizing. According to Floyd, ‘Wittgenstein stressed that getting to the 
particularity of that which is characterized requires attending carefully to the specific way 
and manner of its characterization, and, in particular, to the relevant system(s) of possibilities 
in which it inheres’.25
As we have seen, in the 1912–13 experiments, Wittgenstein expected his test subjects to 
further engage in making illuminated comparisons within an aesthetic system, which then 
would enable them to make meaningful distinctions between right and wrong. The very indi-
viduation on a given occasion of that which we ‘get right’, among the variety of possible 
things that can be said but may just be ‘not as right’ or even ‘wrong’, turns out to be a require-
ment within such an interaction that cannot be eliminated. If my characterization is success-
ful, if it is illuminating, then ways are given to see likenesses and differences, and to go on 
discussing and drawing out from the articulations further aspects of what is characterized, 
which are there to be seen in and by means of it. This lends an illuminating characterization 
a sense of ‘deepening’, which Floyd interprets in terms of logical possibility – a comparison 
is an articulation of possibilities, which invites further comparisons and re-phrasings, serving 
and instancing possibilities for characterization of what can be seen and said.
 24 Floyd, ‘Aspects of Aspects’.
 25 Ibid., 366.
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Floyd’s evolutionary account serves to underscore the philosophical significance of 
Wittgenstein’s 1912–13 experiments on rhythm since the kind of attention to the activity of 
characterizing, and the varieties of techniques for making illuminating comparisons (com-
paring only ‘illuminating notes’), that Wittgenstein was seeking in his conversations with 
his test subjects, turns out to be quite incongruous with the view of logic that was about to 
shape the Tractatus, anticipating, remarkably, the tenets of his much later philosophy. Floyd’s 
important insight is that Wittgenstein’s early disregard of characterizations, his stultification 
of the physiognomic master simile within the framework of the Tractatus via the belittling 
of the specific techniques of characterization involved in symbolizations and representations 
of all kinds, could not do justice to the nature of the logical from his later philosophic point 
of view.26 Yet in the 1912–13 experiments on rhythm, Wittgenstein decisively directed himself 
(and his test subjects) to the logical valences of the physical pulse train, its character, and 
the possibilities for its employment in devising fitting characterizations. Hence, he palpa-
bly showed on that occasion a propensity for entertaining (in the context of thinking about 
music) ideas which are much more logically advanced, according to Floyd’s evolutionary 
account, than what the Tractatus was soon to allow.
Wittgenstein’s physiognomic ‘master simile’ (likening the notion of an ‘aspect’ to the ‘look’ 
or ‘character’ of a face) is virtually covered by his parallel analogy between music (a melody, 
a passage, an entire piece) and the ‘look’ or ‘character’ of a face. Remarkably, this parallel 
analogy was already in the background as early as 1915, when Wittgenstein introduced the 
 philosophically significant analogy between a sentence in language (not being ‘a blend of 
words’) and a melody (not being ‘a blend of tones’; NB, p. 41). At the very beginning of his 
middle period this analogy is already in full bloom.27
The parallel analogy between music and the look of a face in fact indicates another ‘master 
simile’ for Wittgenstein: language as music.28 One of the main characteristics of Wittgenstein’s 
robust view concerning music lies in his approach to music, which undercuts the underpin-
ning of the distinction between music and language by a philosophical theory. Wittgenstein’s 
remarks on music (early, middle, and late) are not at all geared toward a conceptual defini-
tion of the object ‘music’. His robust view concerning music – noticeable even in its primary, 
embryonic display in his 1912–13 experiments on rhythm – is primarily an appeal to the 
importance of shared understanding in learning to listen and play. For Wittgenstein, there 
is no point in thinking about music without specific characterization, no point in think-
ing about musical sound apart from its embeddedness in a specific human gesture, that is, 
apart from what Wittgenstein considered to be the preconditions, and the lived, embodied 
realities, of musical intelligibility – as if there could be a smile without a face, as if musical 
significance could be drawn in like the self-sufficient smile of the Cheshire Cat.
That Wittgenstein makes, like everybody else, the ordinary distinction between language 
and music does not in any way imply that the distinction is, or could ever be, underpinned by 
a philosophical theory based on the drawing of a specific line. As Andrew Bowie points out, 
‘the problem with such a line is that what is supposed to be on each side of the line cannot 
be said to be stable. Furthermore, the resources for drawing the line, that is, language itself, 
may not be sufficient to describe the musical “side” of the line, which has to be experienced 
 26 Ibid., 376.
 27 See CV, p. 19; PG, p. 179. The example from Philosophical Grammar is particularly pertinent, because it shows not 
only the analogy and a bona fide instance of noticing an aspect in music complete with its dynamics of making 
comparisons, but also, quite palpably, its direction: the face is compared with the chord modulation.
 28 The master simile of language as music culminates spectacularly in the Philosophical Investigations. See PI, §§ 
527–35.
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in ways language cannot circumscribe.’29 Wittgenstein’s spelled this out beautifully during 
his middle-period:
To understand a proposition means to know under what circumstances it is true or 
false. If one sets aside this demand for verifiability, one can still ‘understand’ the 
proposition (admittedly in a quite different sense). But in that case even under-
standing a musical theme has a distant similarity with understanding a sentence. 
 Schopenhauer quite rightly saw this in saying that music is a universal variable. In 
musical thinking there actually survives an element of sentence-intonation, of the 
rhythm of accented and unaccented syllables, of pausing for breath, even of question 
and exclamation – hence too the inclination to search for words to go with music. 
Music has developed from singing, it is a kind of prolongation of language, and that 
is important because it shows how language trails off into what no longer would be 
called language. (VW, p. 395)30
The image of language trailing off into music seems to be characteristic of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy mutatis mutandis from the Tractatus to his very late output, where he thinks most 
explicitly that ‘the theme and the language are in reciprocal action’ (CV, p. 85). In the last 
analysis, describing what we hear, what is significant about it, hinges on characterization, on 
drawing comparisons (BB, p. 166). As we have seen, this idea was already distinctly present in 
Wittgenstein’s original thoughts for his 1912–13 experiments on rhythm. Such fluidity was 
brought to the fore in the experiments in terms of noticing an aspect.
The importance of aspects for Wittgenstein became more and more pronounced in his later 
writings (from 1929 until his death in 1951), where his remarks on aspects are replete with 
musical instances. Here are some very instructive examples: hearing a theme as a march or as 
a dance (PI, p. 206); hearing a certain bar as an introduction or in a certain key (RPP I, p. 2, § 1; 
Z, pp. 37–38, § 208); experiencing a certain interpretation of a musical passage as inevitable 
(RPP I, p. 6, § 22); playing a passage with more intense or with less intense expressiveness, 
with either stronger or lesser emphasis on rhythm and structure (RPP I, p. 97, § 507); playing 
a passage with the correct sort of expression (LW I, § 688); hearing one thing as a variant of 
another (RPP I, p. 97, § 508; RPP II, p. 89, § 494); rephrasing a variation in such a way that it 
could be conceived as a different variation on the same theme, hearing a theme differently 
in a repetition (RPP I, p. 98, § 517); hearing a melody differently after becoming acquainted 
with the composer’s style (LW I, § 774).
The most striking thing about these examples is that they encompass virtually the entire 
range of what is fundamental to the hearing and the performance of music: the experience 
of musical motion through rhythm and structure, the identification and re-identification 
of musical materials, the fine nuances of musical expression, and the overarching con-
siderations of performance practice, of genre and style. Thus, the very early Wittgenstein 
had anticipated what the much later Wittgenstein is saying in a clear voice: that which is 
musical is fundamentally aspectual, a matter of characterization, the coming into view of a 
scheme of possibilities for characterization. Indeed, in light of Floyd’s evolutionary account, 
it appears that thinking about and through music has afforded Wittgenstein with a spring 
of serviceable images for his career-long philosophical exploration of the fluidity and com-
municability of aspects. The master simile of language as music was bound to be philosophi-
cally forward-looking and potent. The philosophical significance of Wittgenstein’s 1912–13 
 29 Andrew Bowie, Music, Philosophy, and Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 18.
 30 The allusion to Charles Myers’s view concerning the origins of music in the last sentence is quite striking.
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experiments on rhythm lies, by his own admission, in the way they prompted him to tap into 
such far-reaching ideas for the first time.
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